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 ABSTRACT 
Considering the major refugee crises currently facing the world, this 
essay argues that an examination of earlier such crises is needed in 
order to devise an effective international response today. On this 
basis, it assesses the unique international system that was set up in 
response to one of the largest refugee crises of the twentieth century: 
that of the Palestinians. Like the Syrian refugee crisis today, the 
Palestinian case encapsulated the connection between global politics 
and mass migration.  
On this basis, this article evaluates the merits of the international 
organization responsible for serving the Palestinian refugees: the UN 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Identifying and assessing the key 
features of the UNRWA system, the essay argues that its uniqueness 
generated both benefits and many disadvantages for the Palestinian 
refugees it served. In particular, the Palestinians’ ineligibility for 
UNHCR services has left them uniquely vulnerable when seeking 
international protection.  
Creating a similar international organization to serve Syrian 
refugees today is likely to cause similar problems, and will raise the 
question of whether other large refugee populations also need their 
own UN agencies. However, the internationalist rationale behind the 
UNRWA system is also contrasted harshly with the current imbalance 
in the response to the Syrian crisis, whereby a small number of 
countries are hosting the majority of the refugees.  Thus despite its 
considerable flaws, UNRWA’s precedent still provides important 
lessons for the crisis today.  
 
 KEYWORDS  
refugees, Palestinian, Syrian, UN, UNRWA, UNHCR 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The UN estimates that nearly 6 million people have now fled Syria to seek 
refuge elsewhere. 1  It has described the resulting situation as the worst 
                                                        
1 “Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis in the Middle East and Europe,” EU, accessed January 
13, 2017, http://syrianrefugees.eu  
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refugee crisis to face Europe since the Second World War.2 Yet the vast 
majority of Syrian refugees are in the Middle East and not Europe. 3 
Moreover, it is not the first time in recent decades that Levantine countries 
have born the brunt of the fallout from a large-scale refugee crisis.  
 
This essay argues that learning the lessons of previous refugee crises 
is key for devising an effective international refugee policy today. On these 
grounds, the essay assesses the historical responses to the largest and 
longest-running refugee situation in the Middle East: that of the 
Palestinians. As the Middle East is the same region now engulfed by the 
Syrian crisis, the Palestinian precedent is particularly salient here. The 
international response to the Palestinian crisis was largely channeled via 
the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which will accordingly be the 
focus of this assessment. 
 
Since beginning operations in 1950, UNRWA has provided large-scale 
welfare, health and education services to registered Palestinian refugees 
across the Middle East, playing a particularly important role in the camps. 
As the only UN Agency mandated to serve refugees from a specific region, it 
is unique in its status and functioning, encapsulating the intersection 
between international relations and migration. The central question here is 
that of whether such a system is recommendable for other refugee crises, 
particularly the Syrian one today.  
 
 Examining this question is complicated by UNRWA’s absence from 
much of the relevant literature. Palestinian historiography, while 
acknowledging the importance of refugee history, rarely includes in-depth 
studies of the impact of UNRWA’s work.4 Meanwhile literature in the field 
of Refugee Studies has too often fallen prey to ‘Palestinian exceptionalism’ 
that seals UNRWA off from synoptic studies because of its unusual set-up.5 
The resulting literary gap is particularly glaring in view of the numerous 
                                                        
2 “Urging global assistance for Syrian refugees, European Union at the UN says ‘everyone can 
offer help’,” UN News Centre, accessed January 13, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52055#.WHN9-7FnlE5  
3  “Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis in the Middle East and Europe.”  
4 See for example: Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National 
Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Rosemary Sayigh, The Palestinians: 
From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Books, 2007); Helena Lindholm Schulz, The 
Palestinian Diaspora: Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland (New York: Routledge, 
2003); Helga Baumgarten, “The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2005,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies 34:4 (2005): 25–48; Shaul Mishal, West Bank/East Bank: The 
Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); Muhammad Muslih, 
“Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism,” Journal of Palestine Studies 16:4 (1987): 
77–94.  
5 See for example: Karen Jacobsen, The Economic Life of Refugees (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian 
Press, 2005); Margaret McGuinness, "Legal and Normative Dimensions of the Manipulation of 
Refugees," in Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics and the Abuse of Human Suffering, ed. Stephen 
John Stedman and Fred Tanner (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2003), 135–66. 
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shared features of the Palestinian and Syrian refugee crises; aside from their 
regional proximity, they are both large-scale and both closely connected to 
highly contentious regional and global politics.  
 
This article will seek to address this gap by providing a close 
assessment of the UNRWA system as a case study of an international 
approach to a refugee crisis. Looking at how its unique set-up has worked 
in practice, the essay identifies the key features of UNRWA’s structure, and 
assesses the resulting advantages and drawbacks. The underlying argument 
is that historical precedents should always be considered when examining 
migration crises that share some of the same traits. UNRWA is neither an 
exemplar to be adopted as an ideal model, nor a disaster that should be 
entirely disregarded. Instead, it is a flawed case study that can provide 
much-needed lessons to a world currently struggling to devise effective and 
successful response to continuing refugee crises.  
 
The role of the UN  
 
At its core, UNRWA signifies the UN’s responsibility for Palestinian refugees. 
As such it is an expression of international duty towards humanitarian 
crises, in keeping with the rising internationalism of the post-Second World 
War period in which UNRWA was established. The late 1940s saw the 
dominance of new internationalist norms, according to which refugee 
problems should be the responsibility of the entire world and not just the 
immediate region concerned. This idea was codified in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. 6  The establishment of organizations like UNRWA thus 
theoretically safeguarded the concept of shared international responsibility 
as a way of overriding regional imbalance. In view of recent complaints from 
the Lebanese7 and Jordanian8 governments about insufficient international 
support for their hosting of millions of Syrian refugees, this approach is 
again timely and relevant. 
 
In theory, creating a UN body to respond to specific crises avoids over-
burdening the region concerned, especially when that region might already 
be suffering the political and economic aftershocks of the crisis. This 
approach should result in a comprehensive and streamlined approach that 
channels global opinion, or at least the opinion of UN Member States. 
                                                        
6 Susan M. Akram, “Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications 
for a Just Solution,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31:3 (Spring 2002): 36-51. 
7 Najib Mikati, “My country cannot cope with the Syrian refugee crisis,” The Telegraph, January 
21, 2014, accessed January 13, 2017, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/lebanon/10587174/Lebanon-PM-
My-country-cannot-cope-with-the-Syrian-refugee-crisis.html  
8 Michael Holden, “Jordan needs international help over refugee crisis: King Abdullah,” Reuters, 
February 2, 2016, accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-jordan-idUSKCN0VB0WI  
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Ideally, the representation of the international community should also 
promote political neutrality and with it legitimacy. In the age of 
globalization, the politics of any migration crisis are rarely confined to one 
region, and the establishment of an international organization to manage it 
reflects this. However, the question remains of whether this translates into 
practice – which is where UNRWA provides the all-important case study. 
 
 When it comes to UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees, the direct 
involvement of the UN has led to some obvious benefits. It has given 
UNRWA’s work a higher profile and greater prestige than the same work 
might have coming from a standard non-governmental aid agency. In 
practical terms, its UN affiliation provides UNRWA with greater access to 
governments and more potential resources. In the complex setting of the 
modern Middle East, holding UN status has also enabled UNRWA staff to 
travel across regional borders more easily while carrying out their work. 
Arguably, these benefits to UNRWA in turn also benefit the Palestinian 
refugees.  
 
Importantly, many of the refugees themselves are aware of the 
advantages that the involvement of a UN body brings for their cause. As 
most UNRWA-registered refugees are stateless, the Agency is the closest 
thing they have to formal international representation. Some argue that the 
continuing existence of a UN agency for Palestinian refugees provides a 
positive validation that their plight is remembered on the world stage.9 In 
the simplest terms, UNRWA’s work is taken as an indicator of the UN’s 
ongoing responsibility for resolving the Palestinian refugee situation. The 
refugees’ attachment to this idea is demonstrated by the intensity with 
which they usually protest cuts in UNRWA services, fearing that its 
disappearance will mean they are forgotten on the world stage.10  
 
 Yet the case of UNRWA also betrays many ways in which the 
theoretical advantages of UN involvement in regional refugee crises have 
fallen flat. In particular, rather than gaining the aura of political neutrality 
through internationalism, UNRWA has been tainted by the UN’s political 
controversies. This has had a particularly damaging effect on its 
                                                        
9 Nell Gabiam, “When ‘Humanitarianism’ becomes ‘Development:’ The Politics of International 
Aid in Syria’s Palestinian Refugee Camps,” American Anthropologist 114:1 (2012): 95-107. 
10 See for example: Martin Armstrong, “Palestinians protest against UNRWA cuts in Lebanon,” Al 
Jazeera, February 29, 2016, accessed January 13, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/02/palestinians-protest-unrwa-cuts-
lebanon-160223151011960.html; “UNRWA cuts trigger self-immolation, protests in Lebanon 
refugee camps”, Al Araby, January 14, 2016, accessed January 13, 2017, 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/society/2016/1/14/unrwa-cuts-trigger-self-immolation-
protests-in-lebanon-refugee-camps; Nisreen El-Shamayleh, “UNRWA funds crisis worries 
Palestinian refugees”, Al Jazeera, August 5, 2015, accessed January 13, 2017,  
http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/middleeast/2015/08/unrwa-funds-crisis-worries-palestinian-
refugees-150805155300792.html 
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relationship with the Palestinian refugees – a relationship that lies at the 
core of the Agency’s operations. While welcoming the continuing presence 
of a UN body for the reasons outlined above, many Palestinian refugees have 
at the same time held concerns over the UN’s politics. 
 
This is best explained by the historical context. Since the late 1940s, 
many Palestinians have blamed the UN for facilitating their dispossession 
by legitimizing the partition of Palestine in Resolution 181.11  Numerous 
Palestinian refugees and observers have recorded the resulting hostility 
towards the UN that was commonplace in the camps. 12  As a UN body, 
UNRWA became tarred with the same brush. 13  From the perspective of 
many Palestinians, matters were made worse by the fact that UNRWA’s 
funding came largely from the US and the UK, both Israeli allies. 14  The 
resulting mistrust is far from ideal for either the Agency or the refugees it 
serves. Successive UNRWA Commissioner-Generals have sought to counter 
such perceptions by repeatedly emphasizing that the Agency is apolitical 
and purely humanitarian, but the concerns remain.15 
 
To make matters worse, UNRWA has also had to respond to the 
opposite accusations from other key actors. Again, these have been rooted 
in its UN status, usually the fact that the Agency was established by and 
remains answerable to the General Assembly (UNGA). Citing incidences 
such as Resolution 3379, which stated that Zionism is a form of racism, 
supporters of Israel have claimed that both the UNGA and UNRWA are 
inherently biased towards the Palestinians.16 While Resolution 3379 was 
revoked in 1991,17 these accusations have continued. In 2012, Middle East 
Quarterly journal ran a special edition containing a series of articles that 
                                                        
11 UNGA Resolution 181, “Future government of Palestine,” A/RES/181(II), November 29, 1947. 
12 See for example: Elfan Rees, Report to the Department of Inter-Church Aid and Service to 
Refugees of the World Council of Churches, November 1949, GB0165-0161, File 2, Box 73; Dr 
Leslie Houseden, Report on the Refugee Children in the Middle East, 28 August 1953, Sir Edward 
Spears Collection, GB165-0269, File 2, Box 15, both at the Middle East Centre Archive, Oxford 
University (MECA). 
13 Benjamin Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation: UN Aid to Palestinians (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1995), 101. See also: Fawaz Turki, Exile’s Return: The Making of a Palestinian 
American (New York: Free Press, 1994), 132; UNRWA, Note DUA/L-1, November 21, 1963, File 
RE150 II, Box RE3, UNRWA Headquarters’ Archive (UNHA), Amman, Jordan. 
14 Leila Khaled and George Hajjar, My People Shall Live: The Autobiography of a 
Revolutionary (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), 56, 128. 
15 See for example: John Blandford Jr., Report of the UNRWA Director, A/1905, June 30, 1951, 
accessed January 13, 2017, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/91377BAF198AFBA6052565AE0068263D;  
“Frequently Asked Questions: Final status issues and peace negotiations,” UNRWA, accessed 
January 17, 2017, https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are/frequently-asked-
questions#final_status 
16 UNGA Resolution 3379, “Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination,” A/RES/3379, 
November 10, 1975. For more on UNGA politics see: Bruce Russett and Soo Yeon Kim, “The 
New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly,” International 
Organization 50:4 (1996): 636-639.   
17 UNGA revocation, A/RES/46/86, December 16, 1991.   
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condemned the Agency as prejudiced against Israel and inappropriately 
politicized.18 UNRWA’s UN affiliation has thus had the unintended effect of 
tainting it with the political controversies of the latter. In generating 
mistrust, this has also damaged the Agency’s ability to work effectively.  
  
In practical terms, being affiliated to the UN also places restraints on 
UNRWA’s work. As a body ultimately answerable to the UNGA, the Agency 
must comply with UN resolutions in its actions. It therefore has limited 
autonomy and cannot always act as the situation on the ground may require.  
For example, UNRWA is required to hold to UNGA Resolution 2253 by 
refusing to recognize or legitimize the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem, and 
more generally the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.19 In practice, the 
Agency has needed to work with the Israeli occupying forces in order to 
carry out its mandated operations in these fields. It must therefore walk a 
tightrope in order to comply with the UN while still carrying out its 
mandate. This tension is the opposite of the streamlined comprehensive 
approach outlined earlier. 
 
These problems would be recreated with the establishment of any new 
UN body to serve the Syrian refugees. Indeed, the highly controversial 
nature of contemporary Syrian politics makes it particularly undesirable in 
this case. However, this would be true of any new UN organization, not 
merely one based on the UNRWA model. To assess the specificities of the 
latter, it is necessary to look at its distinguishing features more closely.  
 
UNRWA’s Mandate  
 
Many of UNRWA’s specificities and distinctions stem from its mandate. In 
December 1949, the UNGA created UNRWA as a subsidiary UN organ with 
a mandate “to carry out in collaboration with local governments.. direct 
relief and works programs [for the Palestine refugees]” in five geographical 
fields: the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.20 The scope of its 
mandated work was humanitarian, with increasing emphasis given to long-
term development in later years.21 UNRWA’s creation constituted the UN’s 
first attempt to create a comprehensive refugee relief system, albeit in one 
particular region.  
 
In view of this, it is perhaps unsurprising that UNRWA’s mandate has 
numerous limitations. Its aforementioned geographical restrictions mean 
                                                        
18 Middle East Quarterly: The Trouble with UNRWA 19:4 (Fall 2012).  
19 UNGA Resolution 2253, “Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem,” 
A/RES/2253 (ES-V), July 4, 1967. 
20 UNGA Resolution 302(IV), “Assistance to Palestine Refugees,” A/RES/302(IV), December 8, 
1949.  
21 Lance Bartholomeusz, “The Mandate of UNRWA at Sixty,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28:2-3 
(2010): 452-474.  
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that it does not serve all Palestinian refugees; indeed, there are significant 
numbers outside the so-called ‘five fields’ who are excluded from UNRWA 
services. Egypt in particular hosts a large population of Palestinian refugees 
who cannot seek support from the Agency.22 It is estimated that UNRWA has 
registered less than two-thirds of the total number of Palestinian refugees 
worldwide.23  
 
This is due not only to the Agency’s geographical limitations but also 
to its restrictive definition of who constitutes a Palestinian refugee. 
According to UNRWA, a Palestinian refugee is: 
  
a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two 
years preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who, as a 
result of this conflict, lost both his home and his means of livelihood.24 
 
This definition was developed with operational rather than legal 
considerations in mind. As a result, it excludes those refugees who left 
Palestine after 1948, with an exception for those displaced in 1967. It also 
excludes Palestinians who were not continually present in Palestine for the 
two years preceding 1948, such as those who were studying abroad. While 
it may be argued that such people were in lesser need, the exclusion has 
created inconclusive and highly-contested UNRWA records that cannot be 
relied upon for comprehensive figures of the Palestinian refugee 
population. The Agency’s patriarchal structure has created further 
exclusions over the years, as only the children of Palestinian refugee men – 
not women – can register for UNRWA services.25  
 
The Agency’s mandate is restricted in time as well as space. Despite its 
continuing 67-year existence, UNRWA has retained its original status as a 
temporary agency, with its mandate renewed approximately every three 
years. Its current mandate is accordingly due to expire in June 2017.26 The 
reasons for this paradoxically long-term temporary status are political and 
largely self-evident; making UNRWA’s mandate permanent would imply 
that the Palestinian refugee crisis will never be resolved. However, the 
temporary set-up is also problematic, meaning that UNRWA cannot make 
long-term plans and is compelled to be consistently reactive rather than 
strategic.  
 
                                                        
22 Ibid, 460. 
23  BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Survey of Palestinian 
Refugees and Internationally Displaced Persons 2004-2005 (Bethlehem: BADIL, 2006), 49. 
24 UNRWA, “UNRWA: A Brief History 1950-82,” File RE 100 III, Box RE2, UNHA.  
25 Ilana Feldman, “The Challenge of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a ‘Palestine 
Refugee’,” Journal of Refugee Studies 25:3 (2012): 387-406.  
26 “History and Establishment of UNRWA,” UNRWA, accessed January 13, 2017, 
https://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are/frequently-asked-questions#final_status  
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These problems are worsened by the nature of UNRWA’s funding, 
which comes entirely from voluntary donations. As a result of this 
unreliable income stream, UNRWA has started every year for the last three 
decades with a large projected deficit for its General Fund.27 The last time 
that all core programs were sufficiently funded was in 1986 - and even then, 
the Commissioner-General remarked that funds “fell far short of the 
assessment needed to carry out essential construction projects.” 28  The 
Agency’s deficit currently stands at $81 million.29 As a result, it has made 
significant service cuts over the last two years, reducing its provision of 
health and education so substantially that major protests have been 
organized in Palestinian camps in response.30 This financial instability is 
arguably the most serious practical problem with the Agency’s set-up, with 
the most serious day-to-day repercussions for the refugees it serves.   
 
The nature of the Agency’s mandate is key in distinguishing it from 
other organizations – particularly the UN’s other refugee agency, the High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Like UNRWA, UNHCR was created 
with a temporary mandate to be renewed regularly; but unlike UNRWA, the 
wisdom of this was debated early on and finally formally abolished in 
2003.31 Also unlike UNRWA, UNHCR receives a subsidy directly from the UN 
budget, albeit only for a small proportion of its costs.32 Moreover, it uses a 
legal rather than an operational definition to determine who constitutes a 
refugee, and is accordingly less exclusive in its service provision.33 These 
differences are not merely academic but have solid concrete implications 
that lie at the heart of the debate over UNRWA’s merit as a system. This 
debate is encapsulated in one particular variance, which is covered next.  
 
The ‘Protection Gap’ 
 
The ‘protection gap’ is central to the question of whether the uniqueness of 
UNRWA advantages or disadvantages the Palestinian refugees. Again, it 
                                                        
27 UNRWA Annual Reports, accessed January 13, 2017, 
https://www.unrwa.org/tags/annual-report 
28 Giorgio Giacomelli, Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, A/42/13, 
September 15, 1987, accessed January 13, 2017, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/53936ddf3dd093a1852575530073f2e6/7c
04848f7a9cc45b85256880005773e0?OpenDocument  
29 UN Secretary-General’s Remarks on the Sustainability of UNRWA, May 5, 2016, accessed 
January 13, 2017, https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/un-secretary-
generals-remarks-sustainability-unrwa  
30 Armstrong, “Palestinians protest against UNRWA cuts in Lebanon;” Al Araby, “UNRWA cuts 
trigger self-immolation, protests in Lebanon refugee camps;” El-Shamayleh, “UNRWA funds crisis 
worries Palestinian refugees.” 
31 “History of UNHCR,” UNHCR, nd, January 13, 2017, http://www.unhcr-
centraleurope.org/en/about-us/history-of-unhcr.html  
32 “Figures at a Glance,” UNHCR 2015, accessed January 13, 2017, 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html  
33 Michael Kagan, “Is there Really a Protection Gap? UNRWA’s Role vis-à-vis Palestinian 
Refugees,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28:2-3 (2009): 511-530. 
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hinges on the details of the Agency’s mandate. UNRWA is not mandated to 
provide protection for the Palestinian refugees, only welfare services.34 As 
a result, it cannot pursue political solutions to the refugee crisis. This task 
falls instead to the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), 
which was created in 1948 for this precise purpose.35 When UNRWA was 
established the following year, the UNGA directed it to “consult with the 
UNCCP” on their respective tasks.36 
 
 Of course, the UNCCP was unsuccessful in achieving its objective. The 
Commission’s work hit a brick wall in the 1950s and by the 1960s it had 
become merely symbolic, holding no political weight.37  Despite this, the 
UNCCP has never been abolished and continues to submit annual reports to 
the UNGA – usually stating that it has nothing new to report.38 It has no 
budget and no staff. As a result, there is no active UN body currently 
pursuing solutions to the Palestinian refugees’ plight as part of working for 
their protection.  
 
By contrast, UNHCR’s statute makes explicit reference to its 
responsibility for providing protection. 39  As a result, UNHCR explicitly 
promotes repatriation as a durable solution, and directly engages with the 
politics of refugee crises.40 The Palestinians are exempt from this; they have 
been excluded from UNHCR’s mandate since its creation, due to the 
contemporaneous existence of UNRWA. UNGA Resolution 428, which 
established UNHCR, states that: 
 
..the competence of the High Commissioner.. shall not extend to a 
person … who continues to receive from other organs or agencies of 
the UN protection or assistance.41 
 
In practice, this exception only applies to Palestinian refugees registered 
with UNRWA. No other group of refugees receives assistance from any other 
                                                        
34 Benjamin Schiff, “Between Occupier and Occupied: UNRWA in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip,” Journal of Palestine Studies 18:3 (Spring 1989): 60-75. See also: Bartholomeusz, “The 
Mandate of UNRWA at Sixty.”  
35 UNGA Resolution 194, “Palestine – Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator,” 
A/RES/194 (III), December 11, 1948.  
36 UNGA Resolution 302(IV). 
37 For more on UNCCP’s early work see: Michael R. Fischbach, “The United Nations and 
Palestinian Refugee Property Compensation,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31:2 (Winter 2002): 34-
50. 
38 See for example: Report of the UNCCP, A/66/296, August 12, 2011, accessed January 13, 2017, 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/b792301807650d6685256cef0073cb80/f089fed4
7e7a3779852578ef004ce076?OpenDocument  
39 UNGA Resolution 428(V), “Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner,” 
A/L428, December 14, 1950, Article 1, Annex. 
40 See for example: UNHCR Handbook, “Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection,” 
1996, accessed January 13, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/3bfe68d32.pdf  
41 UNGA Resolution 428(V), Paragraph 7(c), Chapter 2. 
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UN agency or organ. In theory, Palestinian refugees who find themselves 
outside UNRWA’s geographical range should be exempt from the exception, 
and eligible for UNHCR services. In practice, they often fall through the gaps, 
as has been highlighted by the recent plight of Palestinian refugees fleeing 
Syria for Turkey, Egypt or Iraq.42 
 
The variance between UNRWA and UNHCR has led to claims that there 
is a “protection gap” in the services available to Palestinian refugees. Randa 
Farah and Susan Akram both contend that the omission of protection 
services from UNRWA’s mandate means that its activities in this field are 
insufficient and notably deficient compared to those of UNHCR. 43  The 
combination of UNCCP’s long-term inactivity and the Palestinians’ exclusion 
from UNHCR has left them uniquely vulnerable in this regard.44 UNHCR’s 
explicit promotion of repatriation only underlines the point.45  
 
However, UNRWA management argue otherwise. Lance 
Bartholomeusz, Chief of UNRWA’s International Law Division, claims that 
the Agency has “a very clear mandate for protection”, which it carries out in 
its activities across the fields.46 Similarly Karen Abu Zayd, Commissioner-
General of UNRWA from 2005-2010, characterized the Agency in public 
statements as “a global advocate for the protection of Palestine refugees.” 47  
In 2007, she underlined the point by appointing a Senior Protection Policy 
Advisor.  
 
It is certainly the case that UNRWA’s work in this area has increased 
since the beginning of the first intifada in 1987, for example with the 
appointment of Legal Assistance Officers in the West Bank and Gaza to 
monitor the trials of refugees.48 On these grounds Michael Kagan argues 
that while UNRWA is limited in its ability to push for a political solution to 
the Palestinian refugee crisis, it does provide protection through its general 
                                                        
42 Mai Abu Moghli, Nael Bitarie and Nell Gabiam, “Palestinian Refugees from Syria: Stranded on 
the on the Margins of Law,” Al Shabaka, October 19, 2015, accessed January 13, 2017,  
 https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/palestinian-refugees-from-syria-stranded-on-the-margins-of-
law/  
43 Susan Akram, “Reinterpreting Palestinian Refugee Rights under International Law,” in 
Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return, ed. Naseer Aruri (London: Sterling, 2011), 165-
194. Randa Farah, “The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees,” in Problems of Protection: 
The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights, ed. Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney and Gil 
Loescher (New York: Routledge, 2003), 167. 
44 Anne Irfan, “The Unique Vulnerability of Palestinian Refugees from Syria,” March 22, 2016, 
accessed January 13, 2017, http://snpfop.scot/2016/03/the-unique-vulnerability-of-palestinian-
refugees-from-syria/  
45 UNHCR Handbook, “Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection.”  
46 Bartholomeusz, “The Mandate of UNRWA at 60.” 
47 “OPT: Statement by UNRWA Commissioner-General Karen Abu Zayd,” reliefweb, January 
27, 2009, accessed January 13, 2017, http://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-
territory/opt-statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-karen-abuzayd  
48 Schiff, “Between Occupier and Occupied,” 71. Schiff, Refugees Unto the Third Generation, 10. 
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welfare services, reporting on rights abuses and intervening and 
communicating with the relevant governments where necessary.49 
 
Yet it is undeniable that UNRWA’s activities in the field of protection 
are more limited than those of UNHCR, due to its separate and different set-
up. Modifications to UNRWA’s original mandate over the years have given a 
new emphasis to development as well as relief work, but its responsibility 
for protection remains implicit at best. The resulting vagueness leaves the 
UNRWA-registered refugees vulnerable when needing protection, with no 
clear and equivocal protection service to call upon. 
 
The Lessons for the Syrian Crisis 
  
The distinguishing features of the UNRWA system are thus clear. It is a 
unique UN Agency mandated to provide welfare and development services 
to the Palestinian refugees who meet its eligibility criteria. It does not 
provide protection or engage in the political nature of the refugee issue. The 
set-up of the Agency is theoretically transient, as it has a short-term 
temporary mandate and is funded solely by government donations. All 
these features differentiate UNRWA from UNHCR, the UN body responsible 
for all other refugees. The result is that Palestinian refugees are served by a 
unique system that brings them both benefits and disadvantages; a higher 
profile for their cause on the international stage at the UN goes hand-in-
hand with exclusion from the entitlements available to all other refugees in 
the world. 
 
 The question remains of what lessons this case study holds for refugee 
crises today – particularly that of the Syrians, which at least superficially 
shares many features with its Palestinian precedent. As governments 
around the world struggle to devise and implement an effective 
comprehensive response to this unfolding humanitarian disaster, should 
the option of establishing a new and unique UN agency for Syrian refugees 
be considered?  
 
The major argument for such an agency is that it could relieve the 
burden currently placed on Syria’s neighboring countries, many of which 
lack the necessary infrastructure and economies to absorb millions of new 
residents. In 2014, the then Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati warned 
that the country desperately needs more help from the international 
community on this front;50 in 2016 King Abdullah of Jordan said similarly 
that his country cannot continue to absorb Syrian refugees without more 
international support. 51  The establishment of a special UN body would 
                                                        
49 Kagan, “Is there Really a Protection Gap?,” 522-523, 529, 
50 Najib Mikati, “My country cannot cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.”  
51 Michael Holden, “Jordan needs international help over refugee crisis: King Abdullah.”  
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therefore be responding to a palpable and acknowledged need and would 
potentially provide both reassurance and practical support in this regard.  
 
Yet it would also create its own problems. Arguably the Syrian refugee 
crisis does not need a higher profile so much as it needs a more effective 
and efficient international response. It is questionable whether the UNRWA 
system could be described as either. Its short-term mandate and total 
reliance on voluntary donations more often engenders inefficiency and 
temporariness in its planning, neither of which would aid the Syrian 
refugees. There is a risk that creating a new body on this model would in 
practice be little more than lip-service to the ideal of shared international 
responsibility. Meanwhile, modifying the UNRWA system by creating a 
Syrian-specific agency with a UN budget subsidy could fuel calls for the 
same treatment for UNRWA. 
 
 The establishment of a new UN agency for Syrian refugees would also 
have implications for international policy more broadly. It would require 
new criteria to determine the circumstances under which refugees should 
be assigned to particular agencies instead of UNHCR – not to mention how 
long such agencies should operate for. Critics of the UNRWA set-up 
sometimes claim it gives the Palestinian refugees an unfair level of attention 
and an unreasonably high profile compared to other groups.52 The creation 
of a new UN body specifically for Syrians might attract similar criticism, in 
view of the high refugee populations from other countries such as 
Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan. 
 
 Some of the structural problems facing UNRWA today arguably stem 
from the short-sightedness that characterized its original establishment. To 
avoid a repeat of this, serious and detailed consideration needs to be given 
to any plan to create a similar model today. This is arguably the most 
important lesson to be taken from the case of UNRWA and the Palestinian 
refugees.  The latter shows how short-term planning and structural flaws 
can lead to long-term inefficiencies and criticism. As the Syrian refugee 
crisis continues without either political or humanitarian resolution in sight, 
ignoring such lessons is especially imprudent. 
   
                                                        
52 See for example: Danny Ayalon, “The Truth About the Refugees,” December 4, 2011, accessed 
January 13, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_3A6_qSBBQ  
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